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a b s t r a c t
A new perspective on cognition views cortical cell assemblies linking together knowledge about actions
and perceptions not only as the vehicles of integrated action and perception processing but, furthermore,
as a brain basis for a wide range of higher cortical functions, including attention, meaning and concepts,
sequences, goals and intentions, and even communicative social interaction. This article explains
mechanisms relevant to mechanistic action perception theory, points to concrete neuronal circuits in
brains along with artiﬁcial neuronal network simulations, and summarizes recent brain imaging and
other experimental data documenting the role of action perception circuits in cognition, language and
communication.
& 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
A respectable position views motor brain mechanisms as a
slave system under the dictate of cognition. Accordingly, modality-
speciﬁc sensory modules channel information to the central
systems for attention, memory, language, concepts, decisions and
perhaps even “the soul”, which, in turn, drive the motor output
(for illustration, see Fig. 1, and see Fodor, 1983; Hubel, 1995).
In this perspective, perception and action mechanisms work as
functionally isolated (“encapsulated”) modules and their respec-
tive main purposes are to ﬁlter and preprocess sensory informa-
tion for cognitive operations and to dress the cognitive operations
into acts of motor movement.
A radically different position has been developed by Marc
Jeannerod and his friends and colleagues (Boulenger et al., 2008;
Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998; Fuster, 2003; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005;
Jeannerod, 1994, 2001, 2006; Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, &
Sakata, 1995; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia,
2010). In this view, cognition is built from action and perception,
upon sensory and motor brain mechanisms. The action schema of
GRASPING an object would thus not be a motor process only, but
would connect with sensory information about small or large size
(of the to-be-grasped object) and the integrated representation of
motor and sensory properties of the action would become the
vehicle of active memory, attention-to-action, and action-related
meaning or motor semantics (Fig. 2, see also Fuster, 2003, 2009).
Action-supporting parts of the brain would thus change their role
in corticofunctional interplay, from slave to master.
Eminent brain-theoretical arguments support the latter posi-
tion, both structural and functional in nature. Anatomically, motor
as well as sensory systems of the brain are not isolated modules.
They are strongly connected reciprocally with both adjacent
modality-preferential areas as well as more distant multimodal
convergence and integration “hubs” on which other sensory and
motor systems likewise converge (Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998;
Sporns, 2013; Sporns, Tononi, & Kotter, 2005; Young, Scannell, &
Burns, 1995). Physiologically, a major driving force of learning and
plasticity in the brain is the correlation of the ﬁring of nerve cells.
Connected neurons that frequently ﬁre together in synchrony are
bound together more closely at a functional level, whereas
neurons ﬁring independently of each other, or in an antiphasic
manner, weaken their mutual links; even ﬁne-grained temporal
relationships in ﬁring patterns can be mapped by spike-timing
dependent plasticity (Bi & Wang, 2002; Tsumoto, 1992).
When learning to GRASP an object, the correlation between
perceived object size and the motor feature of grasp aperture
can be mapped by the correlated activity of nerve cells encoding
these parameters so that a circuit forms that spans frontocentral
motor, premotor, parietal and occipital-visual cortex. The circuit
links neurons in motor and sensory areas by way of nerve cells in
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adjacent and convergence areas (including “hubs”) in the service
of providing the machinery for an action schema, that is an
ordered sequence of motor movements related to sensory-
perceptual features, which can be adjusted to speciﬁc features of
objects and contexts. Cortico-cortical links between the relevant
motor, sensory and higher convergence areas (see Damasio, 1989)
along with the correlated sensory and motor ﬁring strongly argue
for the existence of such action perception circuits, or APCs, as a
basis of motor function (Jeannerod, 2006). If APCs carry action
representations and link together sensory and motor information
about actions, it appears straightforward to postulate that they
should also be activated when actions, which the individual
regularly performs, are being perceived (Jeannerod et al., 1995).
There is overwhelming evidence for the existence of APCs.
The proof of mirror neurons active during execution of speciﬁc
hand actions and likewise during visual perception of these same
actions, along with their presence not only in one single area but
in both premotor and inferior-parietal cortices, is strong support
for the existence of action-speciﬁc links that integrate motor and
sensory information about speciﬁc action schemas (Kohler et al.,
2002; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Action perception links exist
not only for manual and mouth actions and their related visual
and acoustic perceptions, but equally in the case of human
language, for linguistic-articulatory action schemas and their
auditory counterparts (Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolatti,
2002; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Pulvermüller et al., 2006;
Watkins, Strafella, & Paus, 2003; Yeung & Werker, 2013). Further
converging evidence comes from saccade-related sensorimotor
neurons (Bruce & Goldberg, 1985) and from multimodal memory
cells in prefrontal, premotor, anterior-temporal and parietal cortex,
which provide additional support for the claim that the cortical
representations of stimuli affording actions are organized by
multimodal circuits spanning cortical areas (Fuster, 2003). In
theory, it might be possible that single sensorimotor or mirror
neurons bind action and perception information and cause these
sensorimotor interaction effects, but, because the inﬂuence of
single cortical cells on other cortical neurons is known to be weak
and certainly could not change the metabolism of an entire area, it
appears more realistic that these sensorimotor interaction effects
are caused by neuronal assemblies of hundreds to thousands of
neurons acting together as functional units (Abeles, 1991;
Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998; Fuster, 2003).
Action perception circuits conceived as distributed neuronal
assemblies establish a functional link between speciﬁc sets of
Fig. 1. Illustration of the organization of perception, action and central systems of the cortex as viewed in the modular tradition. Systems for perception, higher cognition
and motor output are viewed as functionally segregated and linked in sequence.
Adopted from Hubel (1995).
Fig. 2. Top panel: action perception circuits (APCs) that link motor and sensory information about actions. When learning to pronounce a syllable or word form, co-occurring
activity in neurons in articulatory motor cortex (M1) and in primary auditory cortex (A1) will trigger correlated neuronal activity in areas connecting these sites, including
premotor (PM), prefrontal (PF), auditory belt (AB) and parabelt (PB) cortex. Neuronal correlation and the available neuroanatomical connections lead to the formation of
distributed neuronal assemblies for spoken word forms (Garagnani et al., 2007, 2008). The inset shows the approximate cortical distribution of such an articulatory-auditory
APC, the putative correlate of a word form such as “grasp”. Bottom panel: Phylogentic development of major long distance reciprocal cortico-cortical connections between
inferior-frontal and temporal cortex in humans. Long distance bundles are shown from left to right for the macaque, chimpanzee and human brains (adopted from Rilling
et al., 2008). Note the strong dorsal connection from inferior-frontal, precentral and central sulcus (IFS, PrCS, SC) regions to areas around the inferior-parietal and superior-
temporal sulcus (IPS, STS) of the arcuate fascicle, which is only present in humans.
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sensory and motor information. As such they provide a mechan-
ism for what Braitenberg and Schüz consider the primary function
of the neocortex, namely “information mixing”, that is the joining
together of speciﬁc information across modalities (Braitenberg &
Schüz, 1998). If a motor, sensory or intermediary neuron (which
connects sensory and motor neurons) each exhibit unimodal or
amodal response properties before learning, the associative learn-
ing mechanism strengthening links between these motor, sensory
and intermediary connecting neurons will make them members of
an APC and thus a multimodal information mixing device. As a
consequence of APC formation, each neuron included in an APC
will be a multimodal sensorimotor neuron. Crucially, speciﬁc sets
of motor and sensory information are being joined together in
distributed neuronal assemblies, each of which provides a
mechanism for one speciﬁc type of action, or action schema. The
need for such a mechanism is particularly apparent in the
language domain, where tens and hundreds of thousand different
word forms, pairs of articulatory-motor and acoustic-perceptual
schemas, are being learned within a few years to set up a rich
language-speciﬁc repertoire. Note that these language speciﬁc
lexicons cannot be explained by an inborn or epigenetic mechan-
ism(Braitenberg & Pulvermüller, 1992; Braitenberg & Schüz, 1992;
Pulvermüller, 1996). The explanation requires cortico-cortical
long-distance neuroanatomical links between relevant areas (for
language in inferior-frontal and superior-temporal cortex) and
correlated activation of both motor and sensory neuron sets.
The necessary high correlation of motor and sensory activation
patterns is guaranteed and explained by the mapping of actions
performed by the individual and the perceptual aspects of these
same actions (see next section below). As information about an
action and its corresponding perceptions are joined together,
action perception circuits also provide a mechanism for mirror
neurons. Repetitive body action along with the Hebbian correla-
tion learning principle and cortico-cortical connections between
relevant sensorimotor and multimodal areas of cortex, therefore
provide an explanation why action perception circuits emerge and,
thus, why mirror neurons and other sensorimotor neurons
exist (Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). In neurocomputational stu-
dies, mirror neuron activity could indeed be shown to emerge
as a consequence of Hebbian-associative learning of actions
and their corresponding perceptions (Garagnani, Wennekers, &
Pulvermüller, 2007; Hanuschkin, Ganguli, & Hahnloser, 2013).
Furthermore, recent experiments in humans showed that mirror
activity in the precentral cortex is indeed tied to aspects of action
perception learning, an observation which further strengthens this
position (e.g., Pulvermüller, Kiff, & Shtyrov, 2012). It might there-
fore seem appropriate to consider mirror mechanisms not as
fundamental, but, instead, as a consequence of (a) action perfor-
mance and self-perception, (b) the fundamental neuroscience
principle of correlation learning and (c) pre-established cortico-
cortical connectivity. We note, however, that for mirror activity
already observable very early in life for a limited set of actions (e.
g., tongue protrusion in newborn babies, Lepage & Theoret, 2007),
it is important to clarify whether correlation learning in a pre-
structured network is relevant – or whether perhaps genetic and
epigenetic mechanisms might be sufﬁcient.
2. Human-speciﬁc action perception circuits
Mirror-like action perception integration mechanisms have long
been envisaged to play a role for speciﬁcally human capacities,
especially language (Braitenberg, 1980; Fry, 1966; Galantucci, Fowler,
& Turvey, 2006; Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy,
1967). The earliest speciﬁcally human developmental stage in early
ontogeny is the babbling phase (months 6–12), which is characterized
by repetitive syllable articulations, so-called “babbling”, and similarly
repetitive motor behavior involving all extremities (Locke, 1993;
MacNeilage & Davis, 2000; Petitto & Marentette, 1991). Over time,
babbling becomes more variable and, along with that, closer to the
phonological structure of the language spoken by care-takers (de
Boysson-Bardies & Vihman, 1991; Vihman, Macken, Miller, Simmons,
& Miller, 1985). Finally, towards the end of the babbling phase, the
infant repeats the ﬁrst words spoken by adults (Locke, 1993). Babbling
and repetitive body movements (including “manual” and “whole body
babbling”) during the second half of the ﬁrst year have the obvious
brain-internal consequence that motor activities are being mapped
onto their sensory consequences. Therefore, speech articulatory ges-
tures are mapped onto the sounds produced by these gestures, hand
motor movements onto visual perceptions thereof, and more gener-
ally, information about body actions can be linked with knowledge
about their sensory effects (Braitenberg & Pulvermüller, 1992;
Braitenberg & Schüz, 1992). When a syllable such as “ba” is articulated,
articulatory-motor and speech planning neurons in inferior-frontal
primary motor (M1), premotor (PM) and adjacent inferior prefrontal
(PF) cortex are active along with neurons in the superior-temporal
cortex stimulated by the speciﬁc self-produced input, which are
localized in auditory cortex (A1) and the adjacent areas of the auditory
belt (AB) and parabelt (PB).1 As neuroanatomical connections linking
inferior-frontal and superior-temporal cortex are available and correla-
tion learning is effective, speciﬁc APCs for phonemes and syllables may
be built in the babbling phase. The phonological APCs may contribute
to the infant’s ability to repeat words spoken by others which, in turn,
is a crucial step in building the large vocabulary of spokenword forms
so characteristic of humans (Braitenberg & Pulvermüller, 1992;
Pulvermüller, 1999). As explained in more detail below, APCs for word
forms and linguistic actions provide a mechanistic basis for social-
communicative interaction. Similar action perception mapping
brought about by human-speciﬁc “manual babbling” may lead to the
formation of APCs including mirror neurons for hand actions in
humans, which may, likewise, be critical for the learning of the
extended repertoire of hand actions and facial expressions typical for
humans (Locke, 1993), which play a key role in human action and
social interaction (Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2009; Keysers &
Perrett, 2004).
Note that the outlined action perception perspective offers makes
new predictions. For example, mirror neurons for speech sounds
and word forms should be present in both fronto-parietal as well as
superior-temporal areas of the human left-perisylvian language
cortex. APT also offers explanations outside the reach of some recent
“association accounts” of mirror neuron activity. It has been stated
that mirror neurons might be a consequence of associative learning
between arbitrary motor and sensory patterns (see, for example,
Heyes, 2010). This approach cannot explain why monkeys have a
hard time learning the mapping of sounds on corresponding motor
schemas, whereas humans easily learn a rich vocabulary of speech
sounds and words. It is as if the relevant auditory-motor link was
much reduced in the former from the very start, which suggests a
neuroanatomical explanation (see discussion below). A tabula-rasa
associationist take has further difﬁculty explaining that mirror
neurons are commonly observed in macaques even in experimental
animals without special training (e.g., for recognizing GRASPING
1 It has been suggested “that the modalities of action and perception are
integrated at the level of the sensorimotor system itself and not via higher
association areas” ( Gallese & Lakoff, 2005, p. 459). Although there is indeed strong
evidence for the integrative multimodal role of areas formerly considered mod-
ality-speciﬁc, the conclusion that multimodal (or “supramodal”) association areas
do not play a role seems too strong. As important functional links between sensory
and motor areas are by way of multimodal cortex (for discussion of recent
neuroanatomical data, see Garagnani & Pulvermuller, 2013), these higher multi-
modal hubs can contribute to the binding of sensorimotor information in action
and semantic processing.
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actions). Crucially, information mixing and mirror neuron activity
cannot be explained by associative learning alone, but require
speciﬁc cortico-cortical connectivity between relevant sensory and
motor areas along with action perception mapping of information,
which provide the substrate and basis for such learning. In contrast
to naïve associationism, the action perception model outlined here
and elsewhere (Braitenberg & Pulvermüller, 1992; Del Giudice et al.,
2009; Pulvermüller, 1999; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) puts that the
“glue” between the circuits’ action and perception parts is provided
by both pre-established neuroanatomical connectivity and neuro-
plasticity caused by sensorimotor correlations during self-performed
actions.
This action perception account offers a coherent set of answers
to three so far still open questions about language: why humans,
and only they, can build huge vocabularies of tens and hundreds of
thousands of words, why (only) human infants babble, and why
human language functions are typically lateralized to the left
hemisphere. All of these questions are answered by action percep-
tion theory in light of neuroanatomical facts. The build-up of a
huge vocabulary requires the possibility for excessive articulatory-
auditory mappings and thus rich connections between inferior-
frontal and superior-temporal areas. The arcuate fascicle provides
these rich neuroanatomical fronto-temporal links. As it is strongly
developed only in humans but not in other primates, where it has
been reported to be absent or rudimentary (Rilling et al., 2008), it
may provide the speciﬁc substrate for building a large “vocabu-
lary” of articulatory-auditory APCs, which may, in turn, be a
prerequisite for a large vocabulary of spoken words. Note this
statement does not imply that the strong fronto-temporal con-
nectivity in itself “explains” the huge human mental lexicon, but,
instead, that such connections are a necessary condition for rich
human vocabularies. The arcuate fascicle may also contribute to
human-speciﬁc articulatory babbling behavior, as with acoustic
input it channels auditory evoked activity to the articulatory
system and may, therefore, lead to generally enhanced levels of
activity in motor systems. Although there is, as to our knowledge,
no direct evidence at the physiological level for such enhanced
motor excitability, the articulatory and manual (actually whole-
body) babbling present in the second half year of human life
strongly suggests a general state of enhanced motor activity as its
origin, a human-speciﬁc hyperactivity (high arousal) stage during
months 6 to 12 so to speak. And ﬁnally, because the arcuate
fascicle is more strongly developed in the left hemisphere than in
the right in most individuals (Catani, Jones, & Ffytche, 2005;
Nucifora, Verma, Melhem, Gur, & Gur, 2005), and action perception
learning of articulatory information may preferentially engage the
left hemisphere, the well-known left-laterality of language in most
humans receives a putative neuroscience explanation.
A crucial experimental test of the role of the left-lateralized
arcuate fascicle in vocabulary build-up can be undertaken by
having healthy human subjects learn new word forms with the
predictions in mind that cross-modal articulatory-auditory corre-
lation of information results in formation of APCs distributed over
superior-temporal and inferior-frontal cortices. Cross-modality
learning of articulations and their resultant auditory speech
sounds would be mapped by APCs relying on the left-lateralized
arcuate fascicle. Crucially, both inferior-frontal activation in speech
perception and left-laterality of speech-elicited brain activity
would only be expected for types of language learning that
provide correlated auditory-articulatory information – for example
when new word forms are articulated overtly (articulatory learn-
ing), but not if subjects learn new words just by listening to them
(perceptual learning). Intriguingly, articulatory learning of novel
spoken word forms by repeating heard items led to an increase of
brain responses to these stimuli, with additional cortical sources
appearing speciﬁcally in left inferior-frontal and premotor cortices.
In the control condition of perceptual learning of novel spoken
word forms, the increase of cortical activity was due to bilaterally
symmetric superior-temporal sources, without inferior-frontal
contribution. As articulatory learning speciﬁcally led to both
inferior-frontal and premotor activity enhancement to learned
speech items and this activity was also left-lateralized as pre-
dicted, these results provide support for action perception theory
of novel word learning and hence for a role of fronto-temporal
connections and especially the arcuate fascicle in such learning
(Fig. 3; Pulvermüller et al., 2012). So, over and above the insight
that “cerebral lateralization is not ﬁxed from birth (…), can change
with age” and may index atypical language acquisition (Bishop,
2013), the laterality of language can be linked to speciﬁc features
of language learning, including the Hebbian mapping of correla-
tions between self-produced actions and resultant perceptions,
which may be essential for such learning.
3. Mirroring is not enough: action perception theory
of cognition
Action perception circuits (APCs or learned mirror circuits) offer a
mechanism for repetition. They provide the information necessary for
the repetition process as they mapmotor knowledge on seen, heard or
otherwise perceived actions – manual motor ones in the case of
typical mirror neurons and articulatory actions in the speech domain.
In the absence of motor output and thus without performance of the
respective movements, the activation of an APC can be understood as
a simulation of an action (Jeannerod, 2006), or action thought. If a
corresponding APC ignites due to the perception of a different
individual performing a corresponding action, one can speak of motor
resonance (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) or alignment (Pickering & Garrod,
2004) between the interacting individuals. Such resonance is espe-
cially relevant in social-affective contexts where empathy and sharing
of feelings is required; mirror neuron circuits for emotional behaviors
seem to play a critical role here (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004;
Fig. 3. Enhanced cortical activity (sources of event-related potentials) elicited by
novel spoken word forms, which had been learned either in an articulatory
condition, by hearing and repeating the novel items (top panels), or in a perceptual
learning paradigm, by listening to repeated presentations of the same novel spoken
word forms (bottom panels). Enhanced bilaterally symmetric superior-temporal
activity to learned novel items (orange ovals, relative to before learning) is seen
independently of the learning method. However, additional enhanced fast auto-
matic left-lateralized premotor, inferior-frontal and inferior-parietal activity to
spoken novel words (yellow ovals) is seen after articulatory but not after perceptual
learning (Pulvermüller et al., 2012). These results suggest that language laterality is
driven by auditory-motor information linking, possibly by way of the left-
lateralized arcuate fascicle. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
F. Pulvermüller et al. / Neuropsychologia 55 (2014) 71–8474
Jezzini, Caruana, Stoianov, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2012). To the degree
that bodies and action repertoires are similar between different
individuals, the set of APCs in their different brains are similar, because
they connect similar motor and perceptual schemas. Congruencies
between bodies and action repertoires guarantee that a degree of
similarity in brain activations is present when individuals interact, and
when they perceive and produce complex actions, for example in
language and music (Bangert et al., 2006; Pulvermüller, 2005; Zatorre,
Chen, & Penhune, 2007). In conclusion, action perception mapping
and mirror mechanisms have contributed substantially to a better
understanding of the neurobiological mechanisms of a relevant set of
cognitive functions.
However, the signiﬁcant advance of demonstrating a brain
basis for mirroring and simulation has been overshadowed by
the belief purported by some that mirror mechanisms are sufﬁ-
cient for cognition. This is not the case, and it was Marc Jeannerod
who, together with Pierre Jacobs, ﬁrst pointed to essential limita-
tions (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005):
“Simulation is an automatic process which can be controlled or
inhibited in the social context. The persistence of uncontrolled
contagion, mimicry, mirroring and other forms of resonance
beyond early developmental stages, or their reappearance in later
life, would be deleterious in social relationships and would
generate maladaptive responses” (Jeannerod, 2006, p. 150).
A recent faction in the literature has seized upon the points
above and similar comments and tried to turn them into criticisms
against the general perspective of mirror mechanisms and action
perception circuits (for example, Borg, 2012; Heyes, 2010; Hickok,
2009; Hickok & Hauser, 2010; Lotto, Hickok, & Holt, 2009). In this
context, it is of crucial importance to demonstrate perspectives
and achievements of action perception theory and related empiri-
cal investigation, and to thus extend the brief paragraph above
into a work program targeting neurobiological mechanisms of
cognition and semantics so far unexplained by simple mirror or
simulation theories. In particular, it seems to be of the essence to
address questions such as the following: How, within a system of
strongly interconnected APCs, can activity be kept within limits to
guarantee network functionality? How are attention and compe-
titive mechanisms implemented so that APC ignitions are under
control? What, at the level of circuits, makes a symbol meaningful,
and how can action perception theory address such “meaning
making”? How can memory and decisions be modeled in APCs?
And crucially: How do APCs connect with each other to provide
a basis of social actions and interactions that go beyond mirroring
and imitation? Answers to these hotly debated questions are
necessary for providing a convincing action perception theory of
cognition.
Therefore, the rest of this article will address these questions one
by one, focusing on cognitive and neurofunctional issues previously
under-represented in action perception theory and experiments,
with the aim of opening fruitful research domains for the future.
First, regulation and control mechanisms will be addressed asking
how mechanisms for control, regulation and attention can be
integrated within an action perception theory. Second, the brain
basis of an overt movement will be contrasted with mechanisms
that make such a movement or action meaningful. Third, the
question of how an action is memorized, embedded into context
and related to goals will be focused upon and some remarks about
abstract combinatorial schemas will be added. Finally, an emphasis
is put on the mechanisms underlying the processing of the same
motor act performed in different social-interactive contexts and with
different communicative function. All this will be done in an attempt
to provide a neuromechanistic model of action, perception and
language processing and to integrate attention, memory, goals and
plans, abstract combinatorial knowledge and social-communicative
interaction with established neuroscientiﬁc wisdom.
4. Attention and regulation
There is a slight discrepancy between the statement that APCs
provide an automatic mechanism for the mapping of sensory on
motor information (see Marc Jeannerod’s statement cited above) and
the need (pointed out there too) to control such activation ﬂow in
speciﬁc social and interactive contexts. How can a mechanism be
both automatic and controlled? The obvious solution is that in
default cases there is automatic activation but special circumstances
may push the system towards a more constrained processing mode.
A well-known example illustrates this change. At the end of their
ﬁrst year of life, towards the end of the babbling phase, infants
becomemore and more likely to repeat back previously heard words.
Such repetition performance can be considered an automatic –
although not necessarily compulsory – process (Locke, 1993). During
that time, infants also learn to suppress the overt motor behavior so
that listening without repetition becomes the default in subsequent
years. The mechanisms for shutting down the motor output are not
fully understood. In a neuromechanistic model of cortical function,
the standard neurocybernetic solution is to introduce regulation
and control mechanisms and adjust the gain of such regulation
(Braitenberg, 1978; Garagnani, Wennekers, & Pulvermüller, 2008;
Wennekers, Garagnani, & Pulvermüller, 2006), so that, with speciﬁc
gain parameter values, the otherwise automatic motor mechanism is
suppressed. If control mechanisms can shut down the motor output
of APCs, some subliminal motor processes in the brain should still be
observable, even in adults during speech perception. Notably, healthy
adults not performing a motor (or other) task activate their premotor
and inferior-frontal cortex when listening to, or when just passively
hearing, speech and other action sounds (Fadiga et al., 2002;
Hauk, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2006; Pulvermüller et al., 2006;
Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2003; Wilson, Saygin, Sereno,
& Iacoboni, 2004).2 Thus, the functional link between auditory and
motor processes remains effective in the absence of overt motor
output. This link seems to be automatically activated by the ignition
of the APC, although feedback regulation can modulate the activation
process.
That any brain requires regulation and control is obvious
(Wiener, 1961), especially because a mechanism for keeping
activity within certain bounds is necessary to prevent both
extinguishing and overshooting “epileptic” activity (Braitenberg,
1978; Palm, 1990). Regulation mechanisms can be realised by
feedback inhibition acting on local clusters of neurons and on
speciﬁc areas of cortex (Elbert & Rockstroh, 1987; Knoblauch &
Palm, 2001). A model of cortical areas that incorporates area-
speciﬁc activation control can be used to learn sensorimotor
patterns, as, for example, when the infants utters its ﬁrst syllables
and words and the cortex maps correlations between articulatory
and auditory information processed by neuronal activation in
auditory and motor areas. As motor-articulatory cortex (M1) and
sensory-auditory cortex (A1) are not directly linked but, instead,
by way of modality-preferential (premotor, PM, and auditory belt,
AB, areas) and fully multimodal areas (especially inferior prefron-
tal, PF, and anterior-, lateral-, and posterior superior-temporal
parabelt, PB, cortex), the waves of activation brought about by
2 A controversy has recently been initiated regarding the status of such motor
activation in speech processing. While established and recent data indicate a
crucial role of motor systems in speech perception (Baker, Blumstein, & Goodglass,
1981; D'Ausilio et al., 2009; Moineau, Dronkers, & Bates, 2005), some authors have
argued against a functional perceptual contribution (Rogalsky, Love, Driscoll,
Anderson, & Hickok, 2011).
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correlated activation of neuron populations in M1 and A1 lead to
correlated activation patterns across a range of primary and higher
areas and thus to the formation of distributed neuronal ensembles.
These distributed ensembles are action perception circuits because
they interlink speciﬁc motor and auditory patterns (Fig. 4;
Garagnani et al., 2007, 2008; Wennekers et al., 2006). In such a
network, the step from automatic repetition to withheld repetition
is modeled by area-speciﬁc regulation, especially by increasing
the gain of the regulation and therefore the degree of feedback
inhibition in the motor cortex (M1).
Regulation and control mechanisms are not only essential for brain
functionality, but are also highly relevant to cognition and represent
prime candidates for mechanistically realising attention. The biased
competition model of attention (Duncan, 2006) views attention as a
combination of mechanisms for pre-activating (biasing) representa-
tions and establishing competition between them; the degree of
such competition can be modulated. Modulation of feedback regula-
tion in a model of local cortical areas and APCs alters the degree of
competition between these circuits. Minimal feedback inhibition
with activity enhancement means availability of ample attentional
resources, whereas strong feedback inhibition means strong inter-APC
competition and limited attention. With high attention, several
representations may be allowed to be active together to a degree, so
that, in case of perception of a meaningless “pseudoword” such as
“crodocile”, several competing word candidates may become tem-
porarily active to a degree (for example those for “crop”, “crocus” and
“crocodile”). In contrast, with strong competition for attentional
resources, such simultaneous activation of different circuits will be
forcefully suppressed. As APCs are neuronal ensembles with strong
internal connections, activation spreads efﬁciently within a single
stimulated circuit, as it is the case if a speciﬁc meaningful familiar
word is being recognised (“crocodile”). The single strongly activated
and strongly connected APC is more difﬁcult to suppress by inhibition
so that its activation dynamics predominate and are inﬂuenced less by
variation of attention (inhibition). If sufﬁciently stimulated by the
presence of the corresponding word in the input, the APC under-
pinning the word “crocodile”may therefore activate to similar degrees
with and without attention-related competition/inhibition in the
background.
The outlined attention-dependent processing differences between
stored items, words (that ignite their corresponding APC), and novel
ones, pseudowords (that only activate partly matching APCs), were
conﬁrmed by neuromechanistic modeling and neuroimaging experi-
ments. Brain-model and real-brain responses did indeed vary greatly
as a function of attention (competition) level for meaningless novel
pseudowords, but much less so for meaningful familiar words (Fig. 5;
Fig. 4. Regulation of cortical activation and sensorimotor learning in a model of the
language cortex. Top panel: core areas of the left-perisylvian language cortex
(inset) and model network of the language cortex including six connected “areas”.
Correlated activity in motor (M1) and auditory (A1) areas, as it is present during the
pronunciation of a word form, leads to spreading waves of activation throughout
sensorimotor and higher connecting areas (premotor, PM, prefrontal, PF, auditory
belt, AB, auditory parabelt, PB), which give rise to the formation of trans-area
neuronal assemblies or APCs. “Jumping” connections between M1 and PF, PM and
BP etc. are also present but have been omitted for clarity (see Garagnani &
Pulvermuller, 2013). One APC is illustrated by highlighted circles and lines. Bottom
panel: a regulation mechanism controls activation levels in each area speciﬁcally
and provides a neuronal basis for attention and task adjustment. The activation in a
given brain area is compared with a target value; the discrepancy between target
and actual activity determines the feedback (Braitenberg, 1978; Garagnani et al.,
2008).
Fig. 5. Attention effects on language processing: theory and data. Top panels: brain
response (MEG, on the left) and brain-model response (on the right) to words (in
red) and pseudowords (in blue) when attention is directed towards these stimuli
(solid lines/inset on the upper right) or away from them (broken lines/inset on the
lower right). Note the great attention-related variability of responses to pseudo-
words and the much reduced attention effect to words (adopted from Garagnani
et al., 2009; Garagnani et al., 2008). Bottom panels: the signiﬁcant interaction of
lexicality (words vs. pseudowords) and attention is illustrated in the bar plot on the
left. The strongest cortical sources underlying the attention effects for both words
and pseudowords are present in left inferior-frontal cortex. (For interpretation of
the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article).
Adopted from Shtyrov et al. (2010).
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Garagnani, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Garagnani et al., 2008;
Shtyrov, Kujala, & Pulvermüller, 2010).
These simulations and associated neuroimaging studies show
that an associative learning model spelt out in terms of APCs can
generate representations that behave in interesting ways. APCs can
of course explain the automatic association of motor and sensory
patterns, and therefore mirroring and simulation to stimulation in
the absence of inhibitory control. Over and above mirroring,
networks including APCs along with regulation and control
mechanisms can explain attention and task effects, such as the
great attention effect on pseudoword processing compared with
the relatively small one on word processing. Task-dependent
attention effects on brain activation to the same stimuli predomi-
nate in frontal cortices (Shtyrov et al., 2010). A neurobiological
account of this topographical speciﬁcity is possible based on a
perceptual ceiling effect: in the perception process, a given APC is
always strongly activated at its sensory end, whereas prefrontal
and motor parts receive only indirect and thus reduced input, so
that activation dynamics due to regulation are most effective there
(Garagnani & Pulvermüller, 2011).
5. Motor movements and meaning
An action such as waving the hand or uttering a syllable can be
viewed as an instantiation of a motor schema. Symbolic commu-
nication rests upon meaning carried by such movements. For a
syllable or other movement to become meaningful, a semantic link
needs to be established between the sign and something else.
In the case of the monosyllabic word “grasp”, a connection is made
with a family of motor schemas or movement patterns typically
performed with the hand. The word is used to speak about such
movements. In brain mechanistic terms, an APC for an utterance,
“grasp”, may be linked to a different APC processing and storing
the information about the motor movement the utterance is used
to speak about. The brain basis of the meaningful symbol would
thus be a higher-order APC resulting from merging two or more
elementary APCs (Fig. 6).
Some words are used to speak about actions (“grasp”), objects
(“bottle”) and their sensory features (“red”); this implies that
semantic links exist between these signs or utterances and motor
or sensory information. Neuroimaging along with lesion data
strongly support the idea that words semantically related to motor
and sensory information activate the respective modality-
specialized areas of cortex. The processing of semantic hand-,
leg- and mouth-related action information is manifest in the brain
response to words such as “grasp”, “walk” and “talk”, as is the
processing of semantically-related sensory auditory, gustatory,
olfactory, and visual information in the processing of words like
“bell”, “salt”, “cinnamon”, “triangle” and “grass” (Fig. 7; Barrós-
Loscertales et al., 2012; González et al., 2006; Kiefer et al., 2012;
Pulvermüller, Kherif, Hauk, Mohr, & Nimmo-Smith, 2009;
Simmons et al., 2007). These activations happen as rapidly as the
earliest cortical signs of meaning processing (within 100–250 ms,
Boulenger, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2012; Moseley, Pulvermüller,
& Shtyrov, 2013; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Hauk, 2009) and func-
tional impairment of the respective areas impairs the processing of
relevant words and utterances in a category-speciﬁc manner
(Boulenger et al., 2008; Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel, & Tranel,
2012; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Miceli et al., 2001; Pulvermüller
et al., 2010; Trumpp, Kliese, Hoenig, Haarmeier, & Kiefer, 2013).
Individuals with autism spectrum conditions, most of whom are
characterized by pervasive motor problems in early infancy and
later life, have recently been found to exhibit a speciﬁc deﬁcit in
the semantic processing of action-related words, which is reﬂected
in the reduction of their language-related motor activity (Moseley
et al., 2013). Even in typically-developed subjects, the movement
of speciﬁc body parts in a drumming exercise has a deteriorating
effect on memory for concordant action words (hand drumming
on hand-related words and leg drumming on leg words, respec-
tively, Shebani & Pulvermüller, 2013). Semantic links to action and
perception information seem to have a causal inﬂuence on the
processing of signs (words). The brain manifestations of word-
meaning connections at the level of the brain are automatic in the
sense that they are manifest even when subjects do not attend to
incoming words or their meaning (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, &
Ilmoniemi, 2005), but, at the same time, they are under the
Fig. 6. The semantic links between a word and the actions or objects that word is used to speak about may be realised by the merging of articulatory-auditory word form
APCs – for example for the word form “grasp” – and the action- and object-related conceptual-semantic knowledge – for example the motor schema of GRASPING. Note that
the hand action of grasping requires relating action knowledge to visual information, which involves both dorsal and ventral visual streams (Jeannerod et al., 1995). The inset
illustrates the approximate cortical distribution of a semantic APC with both linguistic and conceptual parts. Referential semantic links are in red. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
Fig. 7. Manifestation of the sign-action link in motor system activation to action
words. Maximal activation foci reported by a range of fMRI studies targeting the
processing of verbs and nouns typically used to speak about face-, arm- or leg-
actions (“talk”, “grasp”, “walk”) and that of food and tool nouns whose referent
objects afford mouth- or hand-actions. Activation foci for face-, arm- and leg-items
are shown in green, red and blue, respectively. (For interpretation of the references
to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article).
From Carota, Moseley and Pulvermüller (2012).
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control of task and context dependent modulation (Pulvermüller,
2013; Willems & Casasanto, 2011).
These results provide strong support for the position that at
least some semantic links are realised brain-mechanistically as
interlinked APCs reaching into sensory and motor cortices of the
human brain. However, it has been argued that certain types of
abstract meaning might be unexplainable by such an account.
Consider abstract words that are used to speak about feelings and
emotions. In some psychological frameworks, such highly abstract
items can only become meaningful because the subject relates
them to private inner states (Mahon & Caramazza, 2011). However,
semantic theorists have argued that an internal deﬁnition of a
term must fail, as there are no private criteria for accurate word
usage so that arbitrary meanings would result (Baker & Hacker,
2009). The solution is to link the meaning of abstract emotion
terms to the expression of these “internal states” in overt action.
The implication is that the link between abstract emotional
meaning and utterances and symbols is by way of the manifesta-
tion of emotion in action, that is by way of information in the
motor system. The critical prediction from such semantic theoriz-
ing is that the motor system will be engaged by abstract emotion
words, a prediction which was recently conﬁrmed by data
reported by Rachel Moseley (Fig. 8; Moseley, Carota, Hauk, Mohr,
& Pulvermüller, 2012). A further critical prediction now is that
conditions impairing the expression of emotion in action – as seen
for example in autism spectrum conditions – should be accom-
panied by a deﬁcit in the processing of action words and in that of
abstract emotion words too (Moseley, Pulvermüller, et al., 2013).
Speciﬁc types of abstract meaning may be anchored in the
motor system, as illustrated by the case of abstract emotion words.
However, other abstract words may not have a clear semantic link
to motor or sensory information. Consider the utterance “to free”,
which may be used to speak about a judge discharging a culprit by
a verbal action, a guard opening the door of a prison cell, or a
secret agent opening the handcuffs of an ally; or consider the word
“beautiful”, which may be used to designate a ﬂower, landscape,
face or body. In order to learn the meaning of these abstract items,
it is essential to know how to relate the terms to real-life events. A
symbolic explanation of the meaning of these terms seems
insufﬁcient, because, for knowing these words, it is necessary to
be able to apply them to concrete actions and objects (Harnad,
1990; Searle, 1980). However, because the variability of motor and
sensory schemas to which the terms can relate is broad, such
abstract symbols link up with not a single type of motor or object
schema, but rather with a disjunct variety of different schemas.
(Please note that this situation is very different from concrete
words such as “crocodile” or “grasp”, where there is some
variability, but still one (or a very small number of) prototypical
schema(s) predominate.) Assuming such mechanisms of disjunc-
tion are employed in association area “hubs” receiving input from
a range of motor and sensory areas, one may suggest that these
multimodal areas play a main role in abstract meaning processing.
Correlation learning implies that semantic circuits for abstract
words with variable usage weaken their motor and sensory links
(Pulvermüller, 2013). In this sense, abstract terms with highly
variable usage might be semantically based on circuit parts in
higher convergence zones, such as prefrontal and anterior-
temporal cortex, with multiple weak links to sensory and motor
circuits.3
Indeed, abstract words and sentences have been found to
activate higher association hubs more strongly than concrete ones;
relevant hubs were in prefrontal, anterior-temporal and tempor-
oparietal cortex (Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler,
2005; Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009; Pulvermüller &
Hauk, 2006). Such activation would falsify a sensorimotor account
attributing all semantic activity to modality-speciﬁc (or -prefer-
ential) areas, but it is consistent with correlation-driven decou-
pling of variable semantics from speciﬁc motor and sensory
patterns. Admitting the contribution of both hub and sensorimotor
cortex to semantics, it becomes possible to study the interplay of
the two types of semantics in abstract sentence processing.
Interestingly, when processing abstract sentences with a trace of
action meaning coloring the abstract content – as for example in
the case of idiomatic sentences such as “she grasped the idea” –
the putative prefrontal and anterior-temporal areas underpinning
abstract semantic processes became active together with action
networks in motor systems (Boulenger et al., 2009); these activa-
tions even appeared near simultaneously (Boulenger et al., 2012).
In the analysis of an abstract sentence, semantic processes driven
by the construction may therefore be effective simultaneously
with word-driven compositional semantic processes grounding
meaning in action (Fig. 9).
In sum, action perception theory offers a neuromechanistic
perspective on meaning processing which covers concrete refer-
ential and abstract semantics at both the symbol and the sentence
levels. It is difﬁcult to see how classic approaches relating meaning
to processes in a symbolic system can account for the activation
and critical role of sensorimotor as well as different association
cortices for semantic processing.
6. Goals and context
The male monkey mirroring the female's motor behavior in
courtship would not be a particularly successful representative of
his species. As Marc Jeannerod and Pierre Jacob ﬁrst pointed out
(Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Jeannerod, 2006), mirror mechanisms
are not sufﬁcient in social interaction and language, but a mechan-
ism for learning and knowing complementary actions is required. In
the most general case, this means that the individual has to know
that an action of type A is typically followed by an action of type B,
where these actions can be carried out by the same or different
individuals. Linking an action to a far-reaching goal can be under-
stood in terms of action sequences, as it is frequently the second
action in the sequence, or the end-result of that other action, that
Fig. 8. Brain activation (event-related fMRI) elicited by abstract emotion words (in
red), which is compared with that to face-related (in green) and arm-related action
words (in blue). Note that the inferior motor and premotor cortex also sparked by
face and armwords is also activated by abstract emotionwords. In addition, there is
activation of the anterior insula and a range of other limbic structures (Moseley
et al., 2012). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article).
3 Still, even the most abstract and semantically variable concept may require
concrete information. The PROOF concept can hardly be understood without
knowing at least example instantiations of the corresponding highly complex
and variable action schema (see also Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005).
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forms the goal of an antecedent action, as for example when
ordering a coffee in a coffee shop (see also Glenberg & Gallese,
2012).
In spite of breakthroughs in understanding the brain basis of
action–goal relationships (Cattaneo, Caruana, Jezzini, & Rizzolatti,
2009; Fogassi et al., 2005; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), sequence
storage has not been a prime target of the neurophysiological
literature attending speciﬁcally to the interaction of cortical area
functions. Some critics therefore tried to construct an argument
that the lack of coverage of action sequences and action goals
might be a lethal feature of action perception theories of cognition
and language (Hickok, 2009; Lotto et al., 2009). However, as
shown below, this claim is not warranted.
In addition to a mechanism for mapping action perceptions on
their concordant motor schemas, a mechanism for linking actions
into sequences of action schemas is necessary. The neural rule of
correlation learning provides a mechanism not only for the binding
of co-occurring actions and perceptions, but equally for the binding
of sequential events into action chains. This is particular obvious if
neurobiological learning rules are applied that are sensitive to ﬁring
sequence and precise timing. Crucially, it is apparent from neuro-
physiological research that neuronal plasticity depends on the
precise timing of spike sequences, and recent neurocomputational
modeling incorporates such spike-timing dependent plasticity (Bi &
Wang, 2002; Caporale & Dan, 2008; Deco, Buehlmann, Masquelier, &
Hugues, 2011). However, there is a problem if two actions or events
Fig. 9. Brain activation induced by concrete literal and abstract idiomatic sentences including words related to arm and leg actions. Example stimuli are presented at the top
left, fMRI results on the left side and MEG activation dynamics on the right. Top panels: abstract sentences activated temporal and prefrontal cortex more strongly than
concrete ones. Green areas and yellow ovals indicate signiﬁcant activation enhancement for idiomatic strings. Bottom panels: abstract and concrete sentences activated hand
and leg areas relatively more strongly if they included a concordant action word. Note that this activation was seen at the point in time when sentence meaning could be
understood and substantially after the action words had been perceived. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article).
Adopted from Boulenger et al. (2009, 2012).
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are far separated from each other in time (e.g., by seconds), and their
neural correlates may therefore not be active at the same time or in
close temporal vicinity. This situation would make it impossible for
the correlation learning mechanism to become effective, because
Hebb-type learning generally requires simultaneous or near-
simultaneous activation of neuronal sets. In this context, it is
important to see that APCs are strongly connected neuronal ensem-
bles and that one of the fundamental functional implications of their
strong internal connectivity is that they retain or “hold” activity for
some time (Braitenberg, 1978; Wennekers et al., 2006). Therefore,
APC and the action memories they carry may also be active after
stimulation or ignite spontaneously so that the phenomenon of
working memory can be accounted for in neuromechanistic terms
(Verduzco-Flores, Bodner, Ermentrout, Fuster, & Zhou, 2009; Zipser,
Kehoe, Littlewort, & Fuster, 1993) and the spontaneous emergence
of a decision to speak or act can be modeled (Garagnani &
Pulvermuller, 2013). In the present context, it is important to note
that even temporally dispersed events can be associated by correla-
tion learning if at least one of them is being processed by an APC
with strong internal connections exhibiting sustained working
memory activity. The sustained “memory” activity bridges the time
between APC ignitions dispersed in time and results in simultaneous
activation of APCs.
Sequence learning allows one to store the knowledge that, in
courtship, a given action has to follow a speciﬁc antecedent, and that,
within a sentence, given types of words have to follow other types of
words. So, obviously, action perception theory offers mechanisms for
storing sequences and combinatorial information based on the
connections between APCs (Fig. 10). There is ample evidence that
simple chaining mechanisms are effective at the cortical level
(Newman-Norlund, van Schie, van Zuijlen, & Bekkering, 2007) and
that especially inferior-frontal cortex is relevant for such sequence
knowledge (Fazio et al., 2009). Syntactic knowledge links together
abstract categories of words which can be characterized by combi-
natorial features; both inferior-frontal and superior-temporal cortex
seem of importance here (Friederici, 2011; Pulvermüller & Fadiga,
2010). A key question is how an APC account in terms of distributed
neuronal circuits can account for the riddles immanent to human
capacity to generate novel sentences from a limited vocabulary and
previously encountered set of word strings. Neurocomputational
studies show that generalization of syntactic regularities may result
from the mapping of word strings and the frequent substitutions of
similar words in similar contexts, which leads to the formation of a
special type of APC processing abstract combinatorial schemas, such
as “noun followed by verb” (Knoblauch & Pulvermüller, 2005;
Pulvermüller, 2010; Pulvermüller & Knoblauch, 2009). In simulation
studies with neuronal networks incorporating auto-and hetero-
associative properties of cortical connectivity, we recently mapped
information about noun–verb sequences obtained from large text
corpora and found that such combinatorial mapping grouped and
linked words according to both lexical-syntactic and semantic
criteria. Critically, the combinatorial information stored by the
networks was generalized over items with similar combinatorial
properties so that new syntactically correct and semantically plau-
sible word sequences were generated (see Pulvermüller &
Knoblauch, 2009).
These considerations show that, at the linguistic levels of syntax
and semantics, sequential combination of words into phrases and
sentences is compatible with action perception theory. Over and
above such compatibility demonstration, the neuromechanistic
approach to combination may provide a key for understanding
the formation of syntactic-semantic rules and construction sche-
mas underlying the meaningful sentences (for further discussion,
see Pulvermüller, 2002; Pulvermüller, Cappelle, & Shtyrov, 2013).
However, there is still a gap between such syntactic-semantic
knowledge and the use of symbols in social interaction.
7. Social-communicative actions and their sequence structure
Brain research on language has so far mostly dealt with
linguistic structures, that is words and sentences, without con-
sidering language use and communication as a social form of
interaction. The neuromechanistic basis of such linguistic prag-
matic knowledge is still poorly understood. What are the brain
circuits of the communicative actions or speech acts for which
linguistic forms are used as tools (see Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969;
Wittgenstein, 1953)? A word such as “apple” can be used as a tool
to achieve different goals: for example, the goal to NAME an object
in the context of a language exercise, or, alternatively, the goal to
REQUEST and obtain an apple from a shopkeeper or host.4 It is
obvious that in these contexts, the same word and utterance is a
tool to reach different goals and that the word is therefore
associated with context-speciﬁc sets of assumptions and inten-
tions (see, for example, Alston, 1964; Ehlich, 2007; Fritz &
Hundsnurscher, 1994; Stalnaker, 2002): In the NAMING context
with the expectation that the label might be approved as a tool to
refer to the object, but in the REQUEST context with a range of
additional social-interactive expectations, that the other party will
hand over the object, that such an object is available to the other
party and that he or she is in principle willing to pass it, that the
object can be identiﬁed unambiguously and so on. In close
relationship to these different expectations, assumptions, inten-
tions and goals, the different speech acts, in the present example
NAMING and REQUEST, are linked into different typical action
sequences or dialog schemas (see Fig. 11). Note that the different
contexts can be captured by two different types of action sequence
schemas. Description of such action structure is a main task in
Fig. 10. Embedding of APCs into sequences is possible by way of direct links between APCs (red lines) and by indirect links to intermediate combinatorial representations
(not shown). Such combinatorial connections can realize syntactic-constructional links of words into sentences and, critically, pragmatic social-communicative knowledge
linking speech acts into schemas for interactive communication. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
this article).
4 Note that it is not necessary that the different pragmatic roles the utterance
takes on in the different contexts is also manifest in different articulatory- or
acoustic-phonetic features (cf., Borg, 2012). Exactly the same utterance can serve
the different speech act functions.
F. Pulvermüller et al. / Neuropsychologia 55 (2014) 71–8480
pragmatic-linguistic research (Alston, 1964; Ehlich, 2007; Fritz &
Hundsnurscher, 1994; Stalnaker, 2002).
The proposal here is that over and above the level of APCs for
linguistic forms (words, utterances) and their referential semantic
meaning (the objects, actions, features etc. they can be used to
speak about; Fig. 6), there are sequentially-linked action schemas
for interaction types (interlinked APCs as in Fig. 10). The nature of
the sequences is not a simple line-up but rather a tree structure
typical for interaction schemas in which different communication
partners can participate (as sketched in Fig. 11). The sequence
schemas are abstract in the sense that a range of different word
forms and utterances can be used to perform each of the
individual actions speciﬁed at each node of the tree structure. If
two partners, A and B, interact according to the same interaction
schema, they both chose actions from the same complex action
tree schema and understand their partner’s action against the
background of this schema. Therefore one may say, in a sense, that
communication partners “predict” each other’s actions (see
Pickering & Garrod, 2013). However, in a strict sense, it is incorrect
to speak of “prediction” here, as typically a broad range of different
utterances and several action schemas are possible and common
at each stage of a conversation. For example, following upon the
waiter’s offer of “what can I get you?”, a range of utterances can be
used to make speciﬁc requests and the offer can also be rejected. It
seems more appropriate to speak of pragmatic priming of a range
of action schemas and utterance forms, which are “opened up” by
each move of the communication game.5 We submit that, when
interacting according to one dialog schema (for example
REQUESTING), the communication partners have both the same
sequence schema representation active in their brains.
The brain mechanisms for the postulated action sequence
schemas can be assumed to lie in sensorimotor systems and,
when the words (or even larger constructions) appear in the
different contexts, their APCs will ignite while the respective
sequence schema is active as well. In the NAMING context, the
APC of the word “apple” is activated, including its word form part
and its object-related referential semantic part. The referential
word-object link is known to draw upon inferior-temporal ventral-
visual stream circuits (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; Pulvermüller,
1999). In contrast, when using the same word to REQUEST an
object, the emphasis is on the link of the utterance with expected
actions by the partner. Therefore, motor and action sequence
circuits in frontocentral cortex need to be sparked in addition to
the word-related circuit (Fazio et al., 2009; Pulvermüller, 2005). By
assumption, this results in a relative emphasis of motor systems
activation in the REQUEST context.
The proposed linguistic pragmatic extension of action percep-
tion theory makes novel predictions on the neurobiological
mechanisms of language. One and the same utterance should,
depending on the social-interactive context in which it is
embedded, dynamically link with different APCs for action
sequence schemas or object circuits, primarily drawing on fronto-
central or temporal cortex respectively. To use the above example
for illustration once again: the word form “apple”, which is
semantically linked with object knowledge, would strongly acti-
vate this referential knowledge in the NAMING context. The
naming context leads to an emphasis of object knowledge and
attention enhancement of object features by way of reduced
negative feedback regulation in inferior-temporal cortex (atten-
tion-to-object). If the same word is used in the REQUEST context,
the emphasis of action knowledge and up-regulation of motor
systems activation is predicted for processing the pragmatic
representation of the sequence structure characterizing the social
interaction context of REQUESTS. In addition, the word-related
APC is, in this case, linked into a sequence schema of social-
communicative actions, as the word uttered for REQUESTING gives
rise to the expectation of the requested object being handed over,
or the addressee replying with an excuse etc. So, in essence, the
same meaningful utterance is predicted to respectively activate
inferior-temporal or precentral/prefronal areas relatively more
strongly when used as a tool for different social-communicative
actions.
Natalia Egorova recently carried out experiments to elucidate the
time course of cortical area activation in speech act processing. The
same words were used for different speech acts and experiment
participants had to passively watch and understand these social-
communicative actions performed by interacting individuals. Already
100 ms after the word critical for understanding the speech
acts could be recognized, brain activation distinguished between
NAMING and REQUEST actions. There was stronger activation to
REQUESTS and a relevant part of the additional cortical sources were
in frontocentral motor systems (Fig. 12; Egorova, Pulvermüller, &
Shtyrov, in press; Egorova, Shtyrov, & Pulvermüller, 2013).
These results on the brain basis of speech act processing suggest
a local cortical difference which, in part, conﬁrms the above
predictions, although results need to be conﬁrmed with neurome-
tabolic imaging methods and no strong support is so far available
for a relative enhancement of inferior-temporal activation in the
NAMING context. Nevertheless, these results represent a ﬁrst step
towards understanding the brain basis of “How to do things with
words” in social communication contexts (Austin, 1962), which may
be extended in future, for example in the investigation of popula-
tions with deﬁcits in social-communicative interaction with puta-
tive relationship to mirror neuron circuits (e.g., autism, Rizzolatti,
Fig. 11. Illustration of the action sequence structures for the speech acts of
NAMING and REQUESTING and brain areas most relevant for in-depth processing
of the semantic link between word and object (in the case of NAMING, in cyan) and
for that of the pragmatic links between the utterance and its typical follower
actions (in the case of REQUEST, in magenta). Note that, upon NAMING by a
communication partner A, the other partner, B, is expected to correct or clarify,
whereas REQUESTING opens the additional options of following the request and
rejecting or denying it (see Egorova et al., 2013).
5 Pickering and Garrod put much emphasis on communication in which the
listener can exactly predict the wording of the speaker (Pickering & Garrod, 2013).
Such “high entropy” situations appear rare and should not obscure the view on
more typical low entropy unpredictable dialogs, where a range of action schemas
are expectable but individual utterance forms are “predictable” only with low
probability.
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Fabbri-Destro, & Cattaneo, 2009). This topic, so far largely neglected
in the neurobiology of language, is at the heart of language as a
social phenomenon, as an interactive game activity characterized by
action sequences, goals and intentions, commitments about the
“theory-of-mind” assumptions of communication partners, and the
use of general and speciﬁc knowledge related to linguistic forms.
Future research into this area may transform the neuroscience of
language into a social brain science for which the term neuroprag-
matics had once been proposed (Bara, Tirassa, & Zettin, 1997).
Action perception theory is critical in this new endeavor of spelling
out the neuronal circuits of social-communicative interaction.
8. Conclusions
The brain basis of cognition can be understood in terms of
interlinked action perception representations. Mirror neurons and
other sensorimotor neurons support the linking-together of motor
and sensory information into coherent distributed sensorimotor
cortical circuits, which can provide mechanisms for repetition and
simulation. Over and above such mirroring, a model of action
perception circuits incorporates attention mechanisms as regulating
cortical activity and resultant degree of area-speciﬁc competition
between APCs. Action perception circuits are themselves mechan-
isms for maintaining neuronal activity as the strongly connected
neuronal assemblies allow activity to reverberate for some time,
thus providing a mechanism for working memory. Critically, the
link between APCs and merging of circuits into higher-order ones is
available as a mechanism of attaching meaning to motor acts and to
object representations. A novel perspective is offered by the linking
of APCs for linguistic forms with action sequence representations.
This linkage is required to bind words into constructions and,
critically, for embedding linguistic signs into their speciﬁc social-
interactive contexts where they bear their role as tools for commu-
nication. The brain basis of this latter ﬂexible binding between
linguistic form and social function is addressed by recent develop-
ments in the ﬁeld of neuropragmatics.
In sum, the outlined perspectives of mirror neurons, their
explanation in terms of action perception circuits, APCs, and the
broader strategy to build cognition and communicative action
sequence structures from networks of APCs offer a fruitful perspec-
tive on the neuronal mechanisms of attention, language, meaning
and social communicative interaction and can address the issues
outlined in Marc Jeannerod’s important comment cited above. The
previous strategy to postulate separate modules for perception,
motor movement, attention, memory, concepts and theory of mind
falls short of providing concrete mechanisms for how the brain
relates a word to a referent object or how it links the same word into
a sequence of socially relevant actions characterized by speciﬁc goals
and action sequences. Action perception theory ﬁlls this gap by
providing not only strong experimental data on action and percep-
tion, cognition and communication (Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010),
and informed guesses on the neuronal circuits underlying not
hitherto investigated cognitive domains (Kiefer & Pulvermüller,
2012), but, in addition, concrete brain-embodied simulation studies
spelling out cognitive processing in computational models compa-
tible with the structure and function of human cortex (Wennekers &
Palm, 2007; Wermter et al., 2009). These novel neurotheoretical,
-experimental and -computational achievements demonstrate the
importance of mechanisms of motor cognition and motor meaning
(Jeannerod, 2006).
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